



## Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World

This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR.

Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries.

We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes.

Read more about Early Journal Content at <http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early-journal-content>.

JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [support@jstor.org](mailto:support@jstor.org).

Devoted to The  
High-School-College  
Entrance  
Scholarship Fund

# LATIN LEAFLET

Entered at the Post Office in Brooklyn as second-class matter, October 29, 1900

Give Good Ideas  
a Chance,  
Come Whence  
They May

VOL. 1

BROOKLYN, NEW YORK, APRIL 29, 1901

No. 25

The internal purpose of this publication is to provide a Clearing House for secondary classical teachers in New York and vicinity or anywhere else; to afford an opportunity to younger classical scholars anywhere for the publication of their more modest endeavors along the line of original work, which might not otherwise see the light; to stimulate the teaching and quicken the student activity in the classical work in the high schools of Greater New York. The external purpose is to establish one or more College-entrance-scholarships for the most successful graduates from high schools in New York City, to be awarded on a competitive examination. The proceeds over and above expenses will be devoted to a scholarship fund. The labor involved is a labor of love.

## TRUSTEES OF THE SCHOLARSHIP FUND

ARTHUR S SOMERS, Central Board of Education  
WILLIAM E WATERS, College Entrance Examination Board

## Last Notice

### The Annual Meeting of The Latin Club

#### Send Your Postal Card at Once

The third meeting and the first regular annual meeting of The New York Latin Club is called for Saturday, May 4, at 12 M, in the Hotel Albert, New York. Professor C E Bennett will address the Club on "A Roman Waring [Geo. E. Jr] and his Legacy". Luncheon (50 cents a plate) at 12 M promptly. The address will follow, and adjournment will occur about 2 P M. Please send postal card at once to Mr A L Hodges, 36 East Twelfth Street, New York, if you intend to be present.

## Characterizing Clauses in Latin

IN THE LATIN LEAFLET, No 20, Professor Bennett says: "As to the clause of characteristic in general, I have always given full adherence to the opinion of Professor Hale, who in his epoch-making work, *The Cum-Constructions*, expresses the conviction that the recognition by Professor Greenough of this type of relative subjunctive clause was a most signal contribution to the study of Latin grammar. Valuable and important, however, as the distinction is, no little confusion seems to me to have existed and to exist still as to precisely what the clause of characteristic is. Exact definitions have been almost entirely wanting. In my *Appendix*, §§ 370, 371, I have ventured to include two features which seem to me essential and invariable earmarks of the idiom, viz.: (1) The clause of characteristic denotes a fact; (2) It denotes an act contemporary in time with that of the main verb upon which it depends. I feel justified in thus restricting the scope of the term 'clause of characteristic', since this definition does apply with perfect accuracy to a very large class of relative clauses. Rather than extend the term to other constructions logically different, I feel it a duty, imposed by sound syntactical method, to find other names for these other constructions. Syntax deals primarily with logical relationships, and wherever a difference in logical relationship exists, I feel that we should recognize the fact".

Mr Bennett's language would imply that the recognition of the clause of characteristic in general was a contribution made by Professor Greenough. I do not find (*Cum-Constructions*, p 249) that I said this; while in point of fact the recognition of clauses of this type was a commonplace of Latin grammar. For example, it is found in Madvig, *Grammar*, § 364; Zumpt, *Grammar*, §§ 555-561 (I have before me the third English edition of 1859); Andrews and Stoddard, *Grammar*, § 264 5 (I have before me the edition of 1865); Grotefend-Krüger, *Grammar*, § 613 (I have before me the edition of 1842). Indeed, I myself quoted from the last-mentioned paragraph in a footnote on p 102 of my "*Cum-Constructions*".

But I quite agree with the contents of Mr. Bennett's second

sentence. The present discussion about the "clause of characteristic" and "characterizing clauses", as well as notes scattered *passim* through text-books made by many scholars, show that "no little confusion" still exists. I shall confine my criticism to Mr Bennett's view, since it is more easily accessible.

He has given us (in the passage quoted above) the "two essential and invariable earmarks of the idiom", namely that the verb denotes a fact, and that the act is contemporaneous. Then if we have a clause which denotes a fact, but a *prior* act (as in Cic. *Cat.* 2 4 7, *quid enim mali aut sceleris fingi aut cogitari potest quod non ille conceperit*)\*, the clause is not one of characteristic! Shall we therefore have to devise still another name,—let us say "the clause of characterization"? This might be done, and still leave us one or two more names to use for additional discoveries, *e. g.*, the "characteristical clause" and the "clause of characterism". At this point the resources of English would be exhausted, and further discoveries should be forbidden.

But perhaps none of these undistinguishing distinctions are necessary. It is true that "wherever a difference in logical relationship exists, . . . we should recognize the fact"; but it is no less true that we should recognize the fact wherever an *identity* of logical relationship exists. A definition which might be framed for the *ut*-clause of Purpose would "apply with perfect accuracy to a very large class" of examples; but it would none the less be wrong to exclude the corresponding examples with *qui* from the name of Clause of Purpose. The name of a given construction should, indeed, exactly specify its office, and should fit the construction to which it is applied, and no other. But if there are other constructions closely related to this one in meaning, then the distinctive names should be *identical* so far as the forces of the constructions are identical, and differ only in so far as the forces differ. On what condition, now, can we be justified in calling any clause a clause of characteristic? On condition that it *expresses* a characteristic. But if it does this, it *characterizes*, and is accordingly a characterizing clause. But any other kind of clause that characterizes has an equally good right to the name of characterizing clause †. Thus the clause which Mr Bennett calls, according to the two essential and invariable earmarks (to one of which he will now be willing to grant a certain amount of variability), a "clause of characteristic" should be named a *Characterizing Clause of Fact*, while a potential clause that characterizes should be named the *Potential Characterizing Clause*, a "Jussive" clause that characterizes, a "*Jussive*" *Characterizing Clause*, etc., etc.

As regards details, putting aside all questions of nomenclature, I do not find myself much in accord with Mr Bennett's classifications. The example from Mil. Gl. 140, which he calls a Jussive Characterizing Clause ("the room he gave her, in which no one but herself was to set foot"), while it does not fall exactly within any of the categories ‡ of the grammars, certainly does not tell us anything about the *character* or *quality* of the room, and accordingly is not characterizing. Similarly the clause in Brut. 56 ("he wrote speeches for others to deliver") does not in the least inform us what kind of speeches these were, and therefore should not be called a Characterizing Clause of Purpose. On the other hand, Mr Bennett leaves out certain sure types (see below).

Let us now make a fresh start upon the general subject. There are *likely* to be as many kinds of characterizing clauses in Latin as there are essentially different kinds of modal feeling and expression in the finite verb in that language. These are as follows:

\* I owe this criticism to a member of my Latin Seminary, Mr R R Wightmann, of the Morgan Park Academy.

† In this argument, I am in effect only expanding Mr Holmes's argument in THE LEAFLET, No 21, p 2.

‡ The difficulty lies solely in the narrowness of the word Purpose. If we spoke of "Clauses of Plan or Purpose", the first of the alternative words would fit this, and many other examples, exactly.